But whether by images or no, who can readily say? Thus, I name a stone, I name the sun, the things themselves not being present
to my senses, but their images to my memory. I name a bodily pain, yet it is not present with me, when nothing aches: yet
unless its image were present to my memory, I should not know what to say thereof, nor in discoursing discern pain from pleasure.
I name bodily health; being sound in body, the thing itself is present with me; yet, unless its image also
were present in my memory, I could by no means recall what the sound of this name should signify. Nor would the sick,
when health were named, recognise what were spoken, unless the same image were by the force of memory retained, although the
thing itself were absent from the body. I name numbers whereby we number; and not their images, but themselves are present
in my memory. I name the image of the sun, and that image is present in my memory. For I recall not the image of its image,
image itself is present to me, calling it to mind. I name memory, and I recognise what I name. And where do I recognise
it, but in the memory itself? Is it also present to itself by its image, and not by itself?